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Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay
Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional
Confrontation Clause
Eileen A. Scallen*
I. FOCUSING ON A CENTRAL PROBLEM OF HEARSAY
REFORM-THE MEANING OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In this Symposium, Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried dis-
cusses the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the federal Consti-
tution, examining the extent to which these provisions permit,
or even require, liberalization of the hearsay rule.' Professor
Imwinkelried's article raises a preliminary problem of defini-
tion for those of us who address the constitutional dimensions
of hearsay reform.2 When one moves beyond a discussion of
the hearsay rule to a discussion of the constitutional dimen-
sions of hearsay, "reform" has more than one meaning. The
first meaning of "reform" is to liberalize the hearsay rule, in-
creasing the amount of hearsay that may be admitted. How-
ever, as I will argue, hearsay reform in the constitutional arena
can also mean reducing the amount of hearsay admitted. This
route to hearsay reform develops through an understanding of
the three-dimensional meaning of the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment and its counterpart in state constitu-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. I would like to thank Margreth Barrett, David Faigman, Calvin
Massey, Scott Sundby, and Dexter Westrum for their helpful suggestions on
this Article; Professors Edward J. Imwinkelried and Eleanor Swift for their
insights on this piece and their continued encouragement; my research assist-
ants Randi Coven, Mary George, and Terry King, the participants in the Hear-
say Reform Conference, especially Professor Roger Park; and the editors and
staff of the Minnesota Law Review.
1. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: The
Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Lib-
eralization of the Hearsay Rules, 76 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1992).
2. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confronta-
tion Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV.
557 (1992); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Re-
straint on Government, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 615 (1992).
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tions.3 Although federal and state constitutions provide sepa-
rate and independent sources of protection, in this Article,
unless otherwise indicated, I will use "the Confrontation
Clause" to refer to both federal and state provisions for con-
frontation.4 The goal of this Article is both to develop a mul-
tidimensional interpretation of the Confrontation Clause and to
show how that interpretation can be derived through'a process
of practical reasoning.
Professor Imwinkelried makes two observations with very
serious consequences for the interpretation of the federal Con-
frontation Clause. First, he points out an asymmetry in the
United States Supreme Court's treatment of the prosecutor's
and the criminal defendant's burdens in meeting the reliability
requirement in cases raising a Fifth or Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge to the admission of out-of-court statements.5 Professor
3. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right .. .to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In discussing the constitu-
tional limitations on prosecution hearsay evidence in criminal cases, Professor
Imwinkelried notes that "[t]he Confrontation Clause neither explicitly re-
stricts the admissibility of hearsay nor expressly precludes a court from freely
admitting hearsay." Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 524. I disagree with Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried's reading of the "plain language" of the Confrontation
Clause. If one has a right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," it
would seem that the admission of any out-of-court statement, without produc-
ing the declarant, presents a hearsay problem. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (in rel-
evant part, defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing"); Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Con-
frontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavailability
Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 665 n.4 (1986). Indeed, as the Supreme
Court noted, a literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would bar all hear-
say, even hearsay admissible under traditional exceptions, When the declarant
is unavailable. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987). The
Supreme Court has rejected this categorical interpretation of the Confronta-
tion Clause. Thus, the question becomes: when does the Confrontation Clause
permit the use of hearsay? That is the subject of this Article.
4. Several state courts have started to interpret their own state constitu-
tional right to confrontation differently than the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. See infra notes 70-71 and ac-
companying text. These state court decisions are more consistent with a mul-
tidimensional view of the right to confrontation than the United States
Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Should the
federal courts continue to be unwilling to acknowledge the full meaning of
confrontation, separate Confrontation Clause challenges under state constitu-
tions may be the accused's best option.
5. The Supreme Court recently has held that the prosecution may point
only to the circumstances surrounding the making of the hearsay statement in
order to prove the reliability of the statement. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct.
3139, 3150-51 (1990). An earlier case had suggested that the prosecution could
point to corroborating evidence other than the hearsay statement to prove the
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Imwinkelried suggests that the current Supreme Court may try
to eliminate this anomaly between the defense and prosecution
burdens.6 Professor Imwinkelried also notes that in White v.
Illinois7 the United States Supreme Court eliminated the gen-
eral requirement that the prosecution either produce the hear-
say declarant for confrontation or prove that the declarant is
unavailable.8
In White, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting
a four-year-old girl. The prosecution offered, and the trial
court admitted, out-of-court statements describing the assault
that the child made to her baby sitter, her mother, an investi-
gating police officer, an emergency room nurse, and a doctor.
accuracy of the hearsay statement. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986).
However, Professor Imwinkelried demonstrates that this rule is inconsistent
with the Court's approach to determining whether hearsay offered by a crimi-
nal defendant is reliable enough to trigger the accused's constitutional right to
offer evidence under the Compulsory Process Clause. There, the Court has
"consistently held that the reliability is a function of both the circumstances
surrounding the statement and independent corroboration." Imwinkelried,
supra note 1, at 528-29. Yet, it is significant that Professor Imwinkelried also
suggests that the defense in some respects carries a heavier burden in proving
reliability than the prosecution when it seeks to introduce hearsay evidence.
He notes that the prosecution can show reliability and defeat a Confrontation
Clause challenge by establishing the trustworthiness of the statement itself or
by producing the declarant. Id, at 545. When the defense seeks to present
hearsay evidence under the Compulsory Process Clause, it may be helpful to
the defendant to show that the declarant is available, but that showing by it-
self is not enough to entitle it to introduce the hearsay evidence. Id Thus, it
is unclear that the defense and prosecution burdens are truly unequal when it
comes to proving the reliability of hearsay evidence. Should the Court con-
clude that the prosecution and defense burdens are unequal, however, this ine-
quality is justifiable. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
6. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 545-46.
7. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
8. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 525. Professor Imwinkelried notes that
until White the majority of the Supreme Court had adhered to Justice Black-
mun's statement in the majority opinion in Ohio v. Roberts that,
in conformity with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusa-
tion, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the
usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has oc-
curred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the un-
availability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against
the defendant.
448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct.
3139, 3146 (1990) (there is a "general requirement" that the prosecution prove
the unavailability of the declarant); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,
182 (1987) (the prosecution must "as a general matter" prove that the declar-
ant is unavailable to testify at trial).
Only in the co-conspirator context had the Supreme Court dispensed with
the prosecution's need to show unavailability. See United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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The trial court ruled that the statements were admissible under
the state-law hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations
and statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment.9 The Illinois Appellate Court held that admitting
these statements did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to confront the witnesses against him, even though
the prosecution neither produced the child for cross-examina-
tion nor demonstrated that she was unavailable.10 The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Sixth Amendment
does not require the prosecution to produce the hearsay declar-
ant or show that the declarant is unavailable where the state-
ments are admitted pursuant to the "firmly rooted" hearsay
exceptions of spontaneous declarations and statements made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.1
I contend that when one considers the three dimensions of
the Confrontation Clause, both the asymmetry of the defense
and prosecution burdens for proving reliability and a general
requirement that the prosecution prove the declarant's unavail-
ability are justifiable.'2 Under a three-dimensional view of the
Confrontation Clause, White was incorrectly decided. White
should be limited to its unique and emotionally charged factual
situation in federal courts, and should not be followed by state
courts in interpreting their own state's confrontation clause.
To make this argument, it is necessary to develop the mul-
tidimensional analysis I suggest for Confrontation Clause cases.
In this Symposium, Professors Margaret A. Berger and
Randolph N. Jonakait both argue that the Confrontation
Clause is not merely concerned with the evidentiary value of
hearsay statements, but they differ over the nature of the "ad-
ditional" aspects of confrontation.' 3 I suggest that a complete
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause requires careful con-
sideration of all three of its dimensions: the evidentiary, the
procedural, and the societal. The first two dimensions have
been developed most completely by other authors.14 I will fo-
9. White, 112 S. Ct. at 740.
10. Id- The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause issue. Id-
11. Id at 742 & n.8.
12. By a "general" requirement of unavailability, I do not mean an abso-
lute requirement. A showing of unavailability may not be necessary where the
three dimensions of confrontation are satisfied or inapplicable under the cir-
cumstances of a particular case.
13. See Berger, supra note 2; Jonakait, supra note 2.
14. The evidentiary dimension addresses the concern that the reliability
[Vol. 76:623
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cus on the largely ignored third dimension of the Confrontation
Clause, the societal dimension. The societal dimension embod-
ies communal values by granting criminal defendants the af-
firmative right to face their accusers. By interpreting the
Confrontation Clause in light of all three of its dimensions, fed-
eral and state courts may arrive at both a more reasonable and
a more consistent treatment of the constitutional right of
confrontation.
II. MOVING BEYOND THE EVIDENTIARY DIMENSION
OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
There is no dispute about the basic evidentiary dimension
underlying the Confrontation Clause, that is, the testing of reli-
ability through cross-examination.' 5  As Professor Im-
winkelried demonstrates, when the Court recognized the
evidentiary value underlying confrontation, it was a natural
step to permit litigants to substitute a showing of reliability for
cross-examination when the declarant is unavailable.' 6 Thus,
of a statement offered as evidence be tested by cross-examination. The proce-
dural dimension addresses the concern that a hearsay statement may be the
product of misconduct by the prosecution or its agents. Professor Roger W.
Kirst first identified and provided strong support for the existence of the pro-
cedural dimension. Roger W. Kirst, The Procedural Dimension of Cotfronta-
tion Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485 (1987). In this Symposium Professor Berger
elaborates the contours of the procedural dimension with her proposal for a
prosecutorial restraint model. Berger, supra note 2.
15. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980). It is possible that the
concern for the reliability of testimony is more accurately characterized as a
due process concern rather than a confrontation concern. See White v. Illinois,
112 S. Ct. 736, 747 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment);
see also United States v. Ianniello, 740 F. Supp. 171, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The
Sixth Amendment guaranty of confrontation... should not blind us to the re-
ality that the question of the admission of hearsay statements .... whether in
a criminal or civil case, turns... on due process considerations of fairness, re-
liability and trustworthiness."), rev'd on other grounds sub no. United States
v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991). Although cross-examination may be the
best test we have for reliability, cross-examination may not be able to do much
to rattle a witness who is convinced he is telling the truth, even though he is
mistaken. See generally RICHARD D. RmKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMU-
NICATION IN LEGAL ADVOCACY 144 (1990) (summarizing research finding that
inaccurate eyewitnesses are often as confident as accurate eyewitnesses); Ber-
nard E. Whitley & Martin S. Greenberg, The Role of Eyewitness Confidence in
Juror Perceptions of Credibility, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 387 (1986) (find-
ing that perceived confidence has its strongest effect on the perceived accuracy
of the witness's general account of events). Cross-examination may, however,
help to satisfy the other two dimensions of the Confrontation Clause, and is
thus an integral part of the right to confrontation.
16. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 525.
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when one focuses on reliability, the purpose of the hearsay rule
and the evidentiary dimension of the Confrontation Clause are
parallel, although distinct.'7
When the Supreme Court focuses only on the evidentiary
dimension of confrontation, however, the other dimensions of
the Confrontation Clause fade into the background, sometimes
to the point where they can be overlooked or taken for
granted.'5 An illustration of the inadequacy of this one-dimen-
sional interpretation of confrontation is the dispute between
the majority and the dissent in Coy v. Iowa 19 over Professor
Wigmore's comments about the meaning of confrontation at
common law. The dissent emphasized Wigmore's comment
that "'[t]here never was at common law any recognized right to
an indispensable thing called confrontation as distinguished
from cross-examination.' "20 Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority, interpreted Wigmore quite differently. Justice Scalia re-
lied on the same passage from Wigmore,21 but asserted his own
interpretation:
[Wigmore] was saying, in other words, not that the right of confronta-
tion (as we are using the term, ie., in its natural sense) did not exist,
but that its purpose was to enable cross-examination. [Wigmore] then
continued: "It follows that, if the accused has had the benefit of cross-
examination, he has had the very privilege secured to him by the Con-
17. The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee concluded that "a
hearsay rule can function usefully as an adjunct to the confrontation right in
constitutional areas and independently in nonconstitutional areas." FED. R.
EvD. 801 advisory committee's note.
18. Indeed, by limiting the meaning of the Confrontation Clause to its evi-
dentiary dimension, the Supreme Court has made the Confrontation Clause
superfluous.
19. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
20. Id at 1029 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1397, at 158 (James H. Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1974)). The dissent added that "Wigmore considered it clear 'from the be-
ginning of the hearsay rule [in the early 1700s] to the present day' that the
right of confrontation is provided 'not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him,' but, rather, to allow for cross-exami-
nation." Id Even the dissent noted, however, that Wigmore acknowledged
that another purpose to the right of confrontation was to permit the trier to
evaluate the demeanor of the witness by presenting the witness to the tribu-
nal. Id However, the dissent characterized this element as "secondary and
dispensable." Id
21. Justice Scalia quoted Wigmore as saying- "'There was never at com-
mon law any recognized right to an indispensable thing called confrontation as
distinguished from cross-examination. There was a right to cross-examination
as indispensable, and that right was involved in and secured by confrontation;
it was the same right under different names.'" Id. at 1018 (quoting 5 WIG-
MORE, supra note 20, § 1397, at 158).
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stitution." Of course that does not follow at all .... 22
Actually, Wigmore's comment does follow if one moves beyond
the evidentiary dimension. What the Coy majority and dissent
overlooked in focusing only on the cross-examination function
of confrontation was that, at common law, cross-examination
necessarily meant physical confrontation between defendants
and the witnesses against them (Justice Scalia's preferred read-
ing), because in the vast majority of cases in England and colo-
nial America, defendants either chose to or were forced to
represent themselves.2 If confrontation with the accusing wit-
ness occurred,24 the defendants themselves conducted the cross-
examination face-to-face.2 Thus, in stressing the evidentiary
dimension of cross-examination, the Coy majority and dissent,
and perhaps Wigmore himself, overlooked the fact that con-
frontation traditionally meant both the process of cross-exami-
nation and the physical presence of the defendant before the
accusing witness.
The question then becomes whether physical confrontation
of the witness and the defendant has any additional meaning,
given that self-representation in criminal cases is now the ex-
ception rather than the rule. Today, as a part of the Sixth
Amendment, individuals are guaranteed the right to counsel;
indeed, criminal defendants who cannot afford an attorney may
22. Id- Justice Scalia also noted that "[Wigmore said] that a secondary
purpose of confrontation is to produce 'a certain subjective moral effect ...
upon the witness."' Id (quoting 5 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1397, at 153).
23. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823-24 (1975). Throughout most of
English common law history, the accused had no right to counsel. Id- As Eng-
lish common law evolved, the criminal defendant gained more opportunities to
be represented by counsel, but the common law tradition of self-representa-
tion continued in the American colonies. Id at 826-28. At the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted, "even where counsel was permitted, the general practice
continued to be self-representation." Id at 828. Colonial Americans continued
to represent themselves for several reasons, but at least two are clear: this
was perhaps the only time in American history when there were too few law-
yers, and the lawyers that did exist were viewed with "dislike and distrust" as
cronies and reminders of the abuses under the rule of the Crown. Id, at 826-27
(citing CHARLEs WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 7 (1911)). See
also WIzIAm M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN CouRTs 18
(1955) ("It is probably true that the English rule combined with the early
shortage of lawyers in the colonies made it inevitable than an accused should
defend himself in most cases.").
24. And often it did not, giving rise to the procedural dimension of the
Confrontation Clause. See Berger, supra note 2; Kirst, supra note 14.
25. It is not difficult to imagine that in many cases of self-representation,
"cross-examination" probably meant little more than the sheer physical con-
frontation of accuser and defendant.
1992]
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have one appointed for them at the state's expense.26 More-
over, lawyers are no longer as scarce as they were in colonial
America.21 The language and structure of the Sixth Amend-
ment itself suggest that confrontation means more than just
cross-examination. If confrontation meant only cross-examina-
tion, it would have been natural for the Framers of the Bill of
Rights and the authors of the state constitutions to drop the
Confrontation Clause once they added the right to counsel.
Justice Harlan supported this structural argument in a differ-
ent context. Concurring in Dutton v. Evans, Justice Harlan
suggested rewriting the Confrontation Clause to read, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
present and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."28 If
cross-examination and reliability are the only values behind
confrontation, why grant the accused the right to be present ?-9
There is an additional question about whether the Con-
frontation Clause should be interpreted in cases involving hear-
say statements in the same manner as in cases concerning in-
court testimony. The majority in White v. Illinois drew a
sharp distinction between these contexts, dismissing as irrele-
vant Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, which were Confron-
tation Clause cases that dealt with procedures for in-court
testimony in child sexual abuse cases.3 0
The White Court's refusal to apply Coy and Craig leads to
inconsistent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause, de-
pending on how the government chooses to present the testi-
mony. Under the rule in Craig, if the government produces a
hearsay declarant to give in-court testimony, the defendant has
a right to face his or her accuser, at least by contemporaneous
26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
27. However, they still seem to be viewed with "dislike and distrust."
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 827. "What has been is what will be, and what has been
done is what will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun." Ecclesias-
tes 1:9.
28. 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried suggests that Justice Harlan was adopting the "Wigmore
view" of confrontation as cross-examination. Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at
525. As I have argued, it is unclear what Wigmore meant by his comments on
confrontation, but his comments, put in historical context, suggest that he
could not correctly see confrontation as only embodying a right to cross-
examination.
29. Indeed, why have a Confrontation Clause at all when due process en-
sures that the evidence will be reliable?
30. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743-44 (1992) (distinguishing Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) and Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
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closed-circuit television.31 Yet under the rule in White, if the
government presents the hearsay statements through another
witness, the defendant has no right to face his or her accuser.
3 2
A hearsay declarant may be a witness against the accused to
the same extent as an in-court witness.33 There is no reason-
able basis for treating a hearsay declarant and an in-court wit-
ness differently under the Confrontation Clause. By
distinguishing these contexts, the Supreme Court has provided
further evidence that it has taken inconsistent views of the
Confrontation Clause.34 Confrontation Clause cases should be
considered together to produce a more consistent and reason-
able interpretation.
Several evidence scholars believe that other values under-
lie confrontation in addition to, rather than in lieu of, the evi-
dentiary value of reliability.-5 The critical issues then become
the identification of the other dimensions to confrontation and
their implications for hearsay doctrine.36
31. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3165-66 (holding that the right to face-to-face
confrontation is not absolute and may be subordinated to a case-specific find-
ing of necessity).
32. White, 112 S. Ct. at 744. Assuming, of course, that the hearsay state-
ments are "admitted under established exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id.
This is not much of an assumption given the Court's liberal interpretation of
"established" or "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions in White. See id at 743.
33. A hearsay declarant stands on essentially the same footing as an in-
court witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 806, which permits a hearsay
declarant to be impeached by any means that would have been available if the
declarant had testified in court.
34. For example, Craig implicitly embodies the procedural dimension that
the White majority rejects. See 110 S. Ct. at 3165-66. When a child witness
testifies by closed-circuit television, subject to cross-examination, it is unlikely
that the government manufactured or orchestrated the testimony against the
accused. Under White, however, the government can simply avoid the proce-
dural dimension of the right to confrontation by offering a hearsay statement
through another witness. See 112 S. Ct. at 744.
35. See Berger, supra note 2; Jonakait, supra note 2; Kirst, supra note 14,
at 487-90. The Federal Rules of Evidence advisory committee stressed that the
Confrontation Clause had substantive meaning beyond the hearsay rule,
although it did not elaborate on the additional values of the constitutional
provision:
Under the earlier cases, the confrontation clause may have been little
more than a constitutional embodiment of the hearsay rule, even in-
cluding traditional exceptions but with some room for expanding
them along similar lines. But under the recent cases the impact of
the clause clearly extends beyond the confines of the hearsay rule.
FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note.
36. The other dimensions of confrontation have implications for both the
asymmetry between the prosecution and defense burdens in proving the relia-
bility of a hearsay statement before it can be admitted over a constitutional
1992]
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III. MOVING BEYOND THE PROCEDURAL DIMENSION
OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Professor Berger argues extensively and persuasively in
this Symposium for the procedural dimension of the Confronta-
tion Clause.3 7 Professor Berger contends that the Confronta-
tion Clause, considered on its own and in the context of the
entire Bill of Rights, functions to restrain "the capricious use of
governmental power," most notably the ability of the govern-
ment to convict criminal defendants on the basis of manufac-
tured or carefully orchestrated hearsay statements.-3 Professor
Berger views confrontation as going beyond reliability issues to
incorporate concerns about the abuse of prosecutorial power.
Accordingly, she argues that courts should adopt a
"prosecutorial restraint model" in analyzing Confrontation
Clause objections. 39
Professor Berger notes that her prosecutorial restraint
model has some resemblance to the proposals contained in the
government's amicus brief and Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion in White in that all three proposals concern the proce-
dural dimension of confrontation.40 In White, the government
suggested that the Confrontation Clause applies "only to those
persons who provide in-court testimony or the functional
equivalent, such as affidavits, depositions, or confessions that
are made in contemplation of legal proceedings." 41 Justice
Thomas correctly noted that this is an ambiguous standard that
objection, and whether "unavailability" is ever a general and genuine require-
ment for the admission of prosecution hearsay. See infra part V. In addition,
the existence of the "extra" dimensions of confrontation raises the following
questions: Although any hearsay statement is by definition made "out-of-
court," must the hearsay statements be made in the presence of the defend-
ant? And if the defendant's presence is required, what do we mean by "pres-
ence" of the defendant, i.e., will presence by telephone, videotape, or closed-
circuit television suffice? These are among the thorniest evidentiary problems
courts face today.
37. The label for this dimension and the arguments behind it originated
with Professor Kirst. See Kirst, supra note 14, at 490-98.
38. Berger, supra note 2, at 560; see id at 561-62; see also Kirst, supra note
14, at 490-98.
39. Professor Berger would require a court to determine whether hearsay
statements were elicited by the prosecution or by its agents. Those statements
would be presumptively inadmissible unless the prosecution were to produce
the declarant or provide proof that the statements were not the result of lead-
ing or suggestive questions. See Berger, supra note 2, at 561-62.
40. Id at 563-64.
41. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 747 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and in the judgment).
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would be difficult to apply.4
However, Justice Thomas's alternate proposal exalts form
over substance 43 and dispenses with the reliability dimension.
Justice Thomas suggested that "the Confrontation Clause is im-
plicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affida-
vits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 44 Under Jus-
tice Thomas's proposal the prosecution would have to produce
the declarant or prove that the declarant was unavailable
before it could introduce "formalized testimonial materials. '45
Yet such "formalized" materials are arguably more reliable
than oral statements repeated by an in-court witness because
they are usually made under oath and are memorialized. Nev-
ertheless, under Justice Thomas's analysis, the prosecution
could avoid the Confrontation Clause entirely by presenting the
statements orally. The prosecution could simply have a witness
repeat in court the oral accusations made out of court. In
White, for example, the statements the child made to the police
officer might fall under the Confrontation Clause under the
government's approach, because they "arguably were made in
contemplation of legal proceedings." 46 But none of the state-
ments in White present a Confrontation Clause problem under
Justice Thomas's approach. Indeed, under his analysis, the
prosecution seldom, if ever, would be restrained by the Con-
frontation Clause.
Professor Berger's prosecutorial restraint model, however,
is distinguishable in several ways from, and is preferable to,
both the goverment's and Justice Thomas's schemes.47 Profes-
sor Berger's model is not as ambiguous as the government's
proposal, nor is it a wooden, formalistic standard such as the
one proposed by Justice Thomas. 48 The danger of the proce-
42. I&
43. See Berger, supra note 2, at 564.




47. See Berger, supra note 2, at 563 (distinguishing her model from Jus-
tice Thomas's proposal).
48. As much as I prefer Professor Berger's proposal to those advanced in
White, I do not think it provides a complete solution to the Confrontation
Clause problems, both because of severe practical problems in its application
and because it fails to deal explicitly with the societal dimension of confronta-
tion.
Professor Berger's proposal depends on the court's determination of who
the hearsay declarant is and how the statement was created. Three earlier au-
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dural dimension in any formulation, however, is that a court
may fixate on it to the exclusion of other dimensions. While
Professor Berger would not suggest focusing on the procedural
dimension to the exclusion of other dimensions,49 the govern-
ment and Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) in White
did just that, producing an incomplete and unsatisfying inter-
pretation of the Confrontation Clause.s°
thors have attempted to state limiting theories for the Confrontation Clause
based on the type of witness and how the witness's statement was used. See
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule.
Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 129 (1972) (pro-
posing that the "witnesses against" language of the Sixth Amendment be lim-
ited to "principal witness[es]" for the prosecution); Michael H. Graham, The
Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L.
REv. 151, 192 (1978) (suggesting that "witnesses against" be interpreted to re-
fer to those witnesses who testify in court for the prosecution or those declar-
ants who have made "accusatory" statements regarding the defendant); Peter
Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1185, 1206-07 (1979)
(suggesting that "witnesses against" be limited to available declarants "whose
statements the prosecution introduces into evidence against the accused and
whom the prosecution can reasonably expect the defendant to wish to cross-
examine at that time"). These suggestions have been criticized as posing sig-
nificant practical problems in application, for it is difficult to determine which
categories of witnesses and declarants fit these tests. See Kirst, supra note 14,
at 497-98; Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 679-81.
Professor Berger's proposal presents similar practical problems. I do not
think it will be an easy task for a court to determine whether an informant
who is a declarant is acting as an "agent" for the prosecution. Moreover, even
if this determination is possible, I doubt whether a court can determine that
the informant was "passive" or "active" in producing a "product of inquisito-
rial questioning." Berger, supra note 2, at 608. For example, the federal
courts have had little success and much frustration in their attempts to apply a
similar standard in the interrogation context. In Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights were violated when part of the evidence against him at
trial was statements that were "deliberately elicited" from him in the absence
of his counsel after he had been indicted. Id. at 204-07. There has been sub-
stantial confusion about when a statement has been "deliberately elicited."
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 173-80 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 278-89 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The problem with identifying hearsay statements that are actually "prod-
uct[s] of inquisitorial questioning" is even more difficult in the child sexual
abuse cases, where, because of the vulnerability of child witnesses, there is a
finer line between suggestion and recollection. For example, is a social worker
an "agent" of the prosecutor? Is an examining physician? Is the child's
teacher? For a recent discussion of the conflicting views on the suggestibility
of children and problems with their recollection, see THE SUGGESTMILMrY OF
CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR EYEWITNESS TEsTIMONY (John
Doris ed., 1991) [hereinafter SuGGEsTImLrTY].
49. See Berger, supra note 2, at 572.
50. In rejecting the government's argument, the majority in W7hite noted
that as the Court's Confrontation Clause cases have developed, there is more
[Vol. 76:623
THE THIRD DIMENSION
Professor Jonakait agrees with Professor Berger that the
Confrontation Clause is concerned with more than reliability.
But Professor Jonakait argues that the primary function of
confrontation is not to act as a restraint on governmental
abuses. He contends that the Sixth Amendment's purpose is to
grant the accused affirmative rights; "The question is not what
the prosecution did, but whether the accused got a trial by
jury."-'- Thus, to pull these views together, Professors Berger
and Jonakait and I agree that the Confrontation Clause embod-
ies dimensions beyond the evidentiary or reliability concerns
that are also the province of the hearsay rule. Where I differ
with Professor Berger is that I see an additional dimension to
confrontation which makes her prosecutorial restraint model
seem incomplete. I differ with Professor Jonakait in that I do
not see the need to designate any one dimension as "primary"
or "central" as long as the full meaning of confrontation is
brought to the foreground and considered in the Court's ratio-
nales for its decisions. To suggest a hierarchy of meanings to
confrontation poses the danger that the Court will lose sight of
one or more dimensions as it focuses on the alleged "primary"
dimensions, as it has seemed to do by focusing on the eviden-
tiary dimension alone.
IV. THE THIRD DIMENSION OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE: THE SOCIETAL DIMENSION
Although the first two dimensions of the Confrontation
Clause have been analyzed extensively, the third dimension has
been relatively ignored. Thus, in this Part, I want to develop
the societal dimension of confrontation.5 2 In doing so, I will
employ-the kind of "practical reasoning" that has an ancient
history53 and a modern following.M Although I will use the
to the Confrontation Clause than just a concern with the procedural dimen-
sions. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992).
51. Jonakait, supra note 2, at 617.
52. I do not contend that this is the "final" dimension to confrontation,
and welcome additional interpretations. However, it seems that the Confron-
tation Clause has at least these three dimensions.
53. Practical reasoning was first prominently discussed by Aristotle as "di-
alectical reasoning" in On Rhetoric, On Sophistical Refutations, and The
Topics.
54. See e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990); Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 747
(1989); William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Daniel A.
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practical reasoning approach to develop the concept of the soci-
etal dimension of confrontation, I suggest that federal and state
courts should also use practical reasoning in interpreting the
Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court has rejected at-
tempts to state one unified "theory" of the Confrontation
Clause.55 A practical reasoning approach combines the desire
for clarity and consistency in decision making with the need for
flexibility that the Supreme Court has expressed in its past
treatment of Confrontation Clause cases.
Under a practical reasoning approach, interpreters,
whether analyzing a statute or constitutional language, try to
consider all of the possible relevant sources for statutory or
constitutional interpretation.- In the American legal culture,
these sources may include the content and structure of the ac-
tual text, the intentions of the drafters of the provision, the his-
torical context of the provision, the pragmatic aspects of
potential interpretations, and the evolution of the language
over time.57 In examining these sources, interpreters must
keep an open mind and attempt to reconcile inconsistencies as
best they can.ca The result of the process is
likely to be the product of a congeries of supporting, interactive argu-
ments, rather than a single deductive conclusion from one source of
meaning. In this way .... "construction" takes on a somewhat literal
meaning and often consists of supporting arguments working like the
"'legs of a chair and unlike the links of a chain.' 59
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Inten; Practical
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
1137 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 827 (1988).
55. See Kirst, supra note 14, at 486-87; Kirkpatrick, supra note 3, at 681-82.
56. Frickey, supra note 54, at 1208.
57. See id.
58. This is not a simple process, which may account in part for the "moti-
vational" tone of Farber and Frickey's description of practical reasoning-
[practical reasoning includes] a concern for history and context; a de-
sire to avoid abstracting away the human component in judicial deci-
sionmaking; an appreciation of the complexity of life; some faith in
dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance for ambiguity, accommodation,
and tentativeness, but a skepticism of rigid dichotomies; and an over-
all humility.
Farber & Frickey, supra note 54, at 1646. There remains the question of how
one evaluates an attempt at decision making through practical reasoning. Pre-
sumably, the most serious charge that can be levied against someone who pur-
ports to engage in a practical reasoning approach to decision making is that
they relied on a reason which they do not or will not make explicit.
59. Frickey, supra note 54, at 1209 (discussing practical reasoning in the
context of statutory construction (quoting Farber & Frickey, supra note 54, at
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Thus, to interpret, or rather to "construct," the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause, one needs to consider the full three-
dimensionality of confrontation. In other words, any discussion
of only one or even two dimensions of confrontation that ig-
nores the third will result in a "shaky" construction or
interpretation.
The third dimension of the constitutional right to confron-
tation is a societal dimension. By a societal dimension, I mean
one that considers the quality of human relationships. The so-
cietal dimension centers on two accusatorial relationships.
First, there is the relationship between the accused and the in-
dividual who makes the statements offered against the accused.
Second, there is the relationship between the accused and the
formal accusers, in the form of the prosecution and the power
of the state.60 The societal dimension of confrontation is con-
cerned with how these relationships operate, independent of
the reliability of the trial outcome. To describe the societal di-
mension, I will rely on arguments based on the content and
structure of the text; on the history of the Confrontation
Clause, in both federal and state versions; and on the ethical
and pragmatic aspects of confrontation.
A. TEXTUAL GROUNDS FOR A SOCIETAL DIMENSION TO THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Arguments based on the content and structure of the Sixth
Amendment's text support a societal dimension to confronta-
tion. The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."6 1 In Coy v. Iowa, Justice
Scalia summarized the literal interpretation of "confrontation":
[A]s Justice Harlan put it, "[s]imply as a matter of English" [the Con-
frontation Clause] confers at least "a right to meet face to face all
those who appear and give evidence at trial." Simply as a matter of
Latin as well, since the word "confront" ultimately derives from the
prefix "con-" (from "contra" meaning "against" or "opposed") and the
noun "frons" (forehead).6 2
Thus, Justice Scalia's literal reading of the text invokes the vis-
ual image of a head-to-head meeting of individuals.
Justice Scalia's etymology is subject to another interpreta-
1645 (in turn quoting ROBERT SummERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY 156 (1982)))).
60. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
62. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (citations omitted).
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tion, however. The prefix "con-" does not derive from the ad-
verb "contra," but instead derives from "corn," a form of the
Latin preposition "cum," which means "together. '63 This read-
ing strongly suggests the societal dimension of confrontation-a
bringing together of heads rather than an opposition of heads-
conveying an image of dispute resolution by and within a
community. 64
The structure of the text places the actual "confrontation"
between the accused and the witnesses. An early Supreme
Court case suggests that part of the Confrontation Clause is the
right to have the jury view the demeanor of the witness.65 This
textual reading cannot stand. The observation of witness de-
meanor may be one of the core functions behind the Sixth
Amendment right to a "trial, by an impartial jury"66 (to have
your accusers evaluated by your peers), but the structure of the
Confrontation Clause itself provides no role for the jury. The
clause speaks only of the accused's right. Thus, both the con-
tent and the structure of the Confrontation Clause denote a
right to a direct physical meeting between defendant and wit-
ness. Yet a textual analysis alone seems weak: What is so sig-
nificant about a personal meeting of criminal defendants and
63. 1 ERNEST KLEIN, A COMPREHENSIrvE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 326, 333 (1966); THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 85, 89, 91 (T.F. Hoad ed., 1986).
64. One dictionary definition of "confrontation" emphasizes a process
rather than a static moment: "[confrontation is] 1. The bringing of persons
face to face, esp. for examination eliciting of the truth.... 2. The action of
bringing face to face or together for comparison." 2 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICrION-
ARY 815 (1933). In our legal system the state initiates and guarantees the de-
fendant this process of confrontation. This suggests that the constitutional
right to confrontation involves more than a concern with the relationship be-
tween individuals; it also involves the relationship between an individual and
the state.
65. The Court stated that:
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent dep-
ositions or e parte affidavits... being used against the prisoner in
lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness
in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recol-
lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895). This language was also
quoted in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970), Kentucky v. Stincer,
482 U.S. 730, 736-37 (1987), and in the dissent in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1026 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the witnesses against them? For the answer to this question, it
is more helpful to turn to other sources of interpretation.
B. HISTORICAL GROUNDS FOR A SOCIETAL DIMENSION TO THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The historical grounds for a societal dimension center on
arguments about the historical purpose for the Confrontation
Clause, the historical context in which it was adopted, and the
evolution of the concept since its adoption. It is now common-
place to argue that little is known about the Framers' intent in
drafting the Confrontation Clause.67 Apparently, the clause
was a thoroughly uncontroversial part of the Bill of Rights.68
This is not surprising, however, when one considers the histori-
cal context. As I argued earlier, confrontation at common law
necessarily meant both the physical meeting of the criminal de-
fendant and witness and the process of cross-examination. To
the Framers, the clause could have meant no less than this.
Yet we are still left with the question of what value to assign to
a physical, interpersonal meeting.
Today it is possible to separate defendants and the wit-
nesses against them and still have a "meeting" via videotape or
closed-circuit television.69 The development of this technology
has forced courts to ponder aspects of confrontation they would
not previously have had to consider. State supreme courts are
beginning to venture forth with their own interpretations of
confrontation in interpreting their own constitutions. Because
the state declarations of rights and the federal Bill of Rights
share a common historical context, it may be profitable for the
federal courts to look to state constitutional decisions as persua-
sive authority when interpreting the federal Bill of Rights.
The supreme courts of Indiana, Massachusetts, and Penn-
sylvania have held that testimony given by a child witness
outside of the physical presence of the defendant violates their
state constitutions.70 These courts stressed the literal language
67. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 744 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment).
68. See Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation. What Next?, 1 TEx.
TscH L. REV. 67, 75-76 (1969).
69. While the White majority might argue that closed-circuit television
testimony presents no hearsay problem, it would have to concede that video-
taped testimony is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant, while
testifying at the trial or hearing" and is hearsay if offered "to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
70. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991) (child's testimony was video-
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of their confrontation clauses, which are more precise than the
federal version in that they guarantee defendants the right "to
meet the witnesses against [them] face-to-face." 71 The differ-
ence in precision between the federal and state confrontation
clauses may not be significant for two reasons. First, the literal
interpretation of confrontation, which both Justice Scalia and
Justice Harlan gave to the federal Confrontation Clause, is con-
sistent with these state provisions. Second, it is unlikely that,
in the days before portable video cameras and closed-circuit tel-
evision, the Framers could have understood confrontation to
mean anything other than physical confrontation.
The Framers forged the federal and state constitutions in
an age when society valued the spoken word in a way that we,
the video generation, have perhaps forgotten. 72 At that time,
direct and personal oral communication was prized as a central
part of a democratic society.73 As one historian has noted,
"Americans, and all others who 'live' democracy as well as
value it, talk out their mutual concerns. There is no substitute
for face-to-face confrontation." 74 Although our technology has
advanced, perhaps we should consider the historical sense of
what it means to "confront" another human being.
C. ETHICAL GROUNDS FOR A SOCIETAL DIMENSION TO
CONFRONTATION
In striking down a criminal conviction based in part on tes-
timony given outside the physical presence of the defendant,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court quoted extensively from an
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that reversed the
usual focus of the Confrontation Clause:
taped outside of the presence of the defendant); Commonwealth v. Bergstrom,
524 N.E.2d 366, 367 (Mass. 1988) (testimony was given by simultaneous but
one-way closed circuit television); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281 (Pa.
1991) (same).
71. IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; MASS. CONST. art. XII; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
This language is more precise than the federal "confrontation" language, and
is used by 19 of the 47 state constitutions that contain confrontation clauses.
See LEGISLATIVE DRAFING RESEARCH FUND, CONSMUTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES, NATIONAL AND STATES (1991) (collecting state constitutional
provisions).
72. However, anyone who has spoken to a "live" audience has experienced
the connection that comes from the physical confrontation of speaker and
listener.
73. See ROBERT T. OLIVER, HISTORY OF PUBLIC SPEAKING IN AMERICA
(1965).
74. id at xviii.
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Normally the right of confrontation includes a face-to-face meeting at
trial at which time cross-examination takes place .... While some
recent cases use other language, none denies that confrontation re-
quired a face-to-face meeting in 1791 and none lessens the force of the
sixth amendment. Of course, confrontation requires cross-examina-
tion in addition to a face-to-face meeting. The right of cross-examina-
tion reinforces the importance of physical confrontation. Most believe
that in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and com-
munication are influenced by face-to-face challenge. This feature is a
part of the sixth amendment right additional to the right of cold, logi-
cal cross-examination by one's counsel.7 5
In stressing the value of the physical confrontation of the
defendant and witness, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ap-
peared to be primarily concerned with the reliability dimension
of confrontation, but when the court noted the effect of con-
frontation on communication, it was also emphasizing the socie-
tal dimension of confrontation. The court was acknowledging
that the function of an interpersonal meeting is to produce a
very real, but intangible effect.
Justice Scalia made a similar argument in Coy v. Iowa, ar-
guing that human beings regard personal confrontation as "nec-
essary for fairness."76 Justice Scalia supported this argument
with essentially literary evidence: a quote from the Bible re-
garding Roman practice,77 a quote from Shakespeare's Richard
H, 78 and a homely anecdote told by President Eisenhower,79 all
illustrating the societal value of a personal confrontation be-
75. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371-72 (Mass. 1988) (cit-
ing United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (citations omit-
ted, emphasis added)).
76. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1988).
77. There are indications that a right of confrontation existed under
Roman law. The Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper
treatment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: "It is not the manner of the
Romans to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his
accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself
against the charges."
Id at 1015-16 (quoting Acts 25:16).
78. "Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation
when he had Richard the Second say: 'Then call them to our presence-face
to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the
accused freely speak .... ." Id. at 1016 (quoting WnjAM SHAKESPEARE, RICH-
ARD II, act 1, sc. 1).
79. President Eisenhower once described face-to-face confrontation
as part of the code of his home town of Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene,
he said, it was necessary to "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom
you disagree. You could not sneak up on him from behind, or do any
damage to him, without suffering the penalty of an outraged citi-
zenry.... In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he
must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow."
I&. at 1017-18 (quoting press release of remarks given to the B'nai B'rith Anti-
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tween individuals. The dissent chided Justice Scalia for his use
of these examples, 0 and it is fascinating to see Justice Scalia,
not known for using literary sources as guides to constitutional
interpretation, defend his examples: "We have cited [Shake-
speare and Eisenhower] merely to illustrate the meaning of
'confrontation,' and both the antiquity and currency of the
human feeling that a criminal trial is not just unless one can
confront his accusers." 8' Although somewhat self-conscious,
Justice Scalia's attempt to argue in this manner may provide
support for those who contend that one value of the "Law and
Literature" movement is to explore dimensions of the law gen-
erally unexpressed in traditional legal sources.82
These arguments support the claim that confrontation is
necessary as part of the social relationship between the individ-
ual defendant and the accusing witness. However, defendants
are actually guaranteed a right to confrontation on two levels:
confrontation with the individual witnesses against them and
confrontation with the state through its agents. Indeed, the
draft of the Sixth Amendment proposed before the House of
Representatives by Virginia's representative, James Madison,
borrowed from his state's Declaration of Rights, seemed to dis-
tinguish between these two levels by providing a criminal de-
fendant the right "to be confronted with his accusers and the
witnesses against him."sa Although the final version of the
Defamation League, November 23, 1953). Justice Scalia also relies on the com-
mon saying, "Look me in the eye and say that." Id at 1018.
80. Id at 1029 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent even tried to take
on the validity of the Shakespearian view of confrontation as being inconsis-
tent, according to Wigmore, with the common law view of confrontation as
cross-examination. Id at 1029-30. As I argued earlier, either Wigmore himself
or this interpretation of Wigmore is flatly wrong. At common law, confronta-
tion by necessity meant both physical confrontation and cross-examination.
See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
81. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018 & n.2. In fact, this was Justice Scalia's second
attempt at defending himself on this point; earlier in the opinion he stated:
"This opinion is embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity
in part to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair
trial in a criminal prosecution.'" Id at 1017 (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE
PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984); James B. White, What
Can a Lawyer Learn From Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (book
review of RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw & LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELA-
TION (1988)).
83. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). The House approved
Madison's language without debate. 2 BERNARD ScHwARTz, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY 1121-38 (1971). The Senate also approved
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Sixth Amendment was shortened to its present form, the two
levels of responsibility inherent in the Confrontation Clause re-
main. The language and structure of the Sixth Amendment,
taken as a whole, constitutionalize the adversarial "meeting" of
the individual and the state.84 In this sense, the Confrontation
Clause represents the societal relationships underlying the ad-
versary system.
Although he did not use these terms, Justice Scalia made a
strong argument for the societal dimension of confrontation be-
tween the individual and the state in Coy v. Iowa.a5 He stated
that "confrontation 'contributes to the establishment of a sys-
tem of criminal justice in which the perception as well as the
reality of fairness prevails.' "86 Justice Scalia argued that both
elements of confrontation-a physical face-to-face meeting be-
tween the accused and the witness and the right to cross-ex-
amine the witness--" 'ensur[e] the integrity of the factfinding
process.' "87
The social relationship between the individual and the
state as accuser imposes obligations that have practical conse-
quences in applying the Confrontation Clause. Professor Elea-
nor Swift has argued that "the confrontation clause may impose
a moral limit on the extent to which the government may de-
it as written and sent the proposed Bill of Rights back to the House to con-
sider other suggested changes. I&, at 1145-57. The House Conference Commit-
tee, which considered the Senate's proposed changes, shortened the
Confrontation Clause to its present form, which was accepted and forwarded
to the states for ratification. I&i at 1159-66. The language of the Sixth Amend-
ment was not controversial and was apparently adopted by the states without
debate. Id- at 1171-93.
84. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). The Faretta Court
stated that:
The rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process when
taken together, guarantee that a criminal charge may be answered in
a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration of
American justice .... In short, the [Sixth] Amendment constitution-
alizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we
know it.
Id (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
85. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
86. Id. at 1018-19 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)). See
also Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1092 (1991)
('Live testimony may be essential to perceptions of fairness, regardless of the
real relation between live testimony and accuracy of outcomes.").




part from offering witnesses. 8 8 Professor Swift argues that not
only is the prosecution traditionally held to higher ethical stan-
dards in proving its case, but also that
[t]he preference for face-to-face accusation also represents a basic
political commitment to shared responsibility for outcomes underly-
ing our system of trial adjudication. The presence of witnesses in
criminal cases, as well as the use of juries, contributes individual con-
science to judgments of guilt. The prosecution cannot succeed with-
out witnesses whose knowledge is stated in court in the presence of
the defendant, and whose credibility is tested by nonaccountable lay
juries. A commitment to interpose the personal moral responsibility
of witnesses as accusers and juries as decisionmakers between the in-
dividual defendant and the state may distinguish criminal prosecu-
tions from civil trials.8 9
To satisfy the ethical demands of its relationship with the
individual criminal defendant, the state must do all that it can
to provide an actual confrontation on the individual level, and
when this actual confrontation is impossible, the state must do
its best to protect the other dimensions of confrontation. The
state cannot guarantee a criminal defendant an accurate out-
come to the trial; witnesses may lie, may be mistaken, or may
not recall eventsP° The state can, however, guarantee its crimi-
nal defendants that it will do everything possible to produce a
hearsay declarant to afford these defendants an actual confron-
tation with their individual accusers. When the state cannot
produce the declarant because the declarant is dead, or other-
wise unavailable in the traditional sense,91 the state must do its
88. Eleanor Swift, Abolishing The Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 495, 512
(1987).
89. Id. at 512 n.45.
90. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558-59 (1988). The result in
Owens makes sense under a three-dimensional view of the Confrontation
Clause. In Owens, little, if any, reliability could be provided by cross-examina-
tion because the declarant had suffered major brain trauma from an attack al-
legedly committed by the defendant. Id- at 556. Although the declarant
recalled telling an FBI agent that the defendant attacked him, he did not re-
call anything about the underlying incident. Id Nor did he recall much of
anything else about his hospital stay. Id The prosecution did, however, pro-
duce the declarant to testify. Id This may not wholly satisfy the second di-
mension of confrontation, but it does support the conclusion that the
prosecution did not totally fabricate the testimony. See Berger, supra note 2,
at 595. Producing a declarant, even one that has little recall, does, however,
satisfy the societal dimension of confrontation.
91. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a) (definition of unavailability). This is not to
suggest that courts may not recognize other grounds of unavailability in a par-
ticular case, such as where a witness may experience "severe and long lasting
emotional trauma" by testifying. See Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d
366, 376 (Mass. 1988) (considering the effect on a child testifying in court). I
would not, however, limit this ground of unavailability to child witnesses. Any
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best to protect the nonsocietal dimensions of confrontation.
That is, the state must require high standards of reliability for
the hearsay statement and prove that the statement was not
the product of the prosecution or an inquisitorial process.
These normative prescriptions, aside from their intrinsic ap-
peal, can be justified on pragmatic grounds.
D. PRAGMATIC GROUNDS FOR A SOCIETAL DIMENSION TO
CONFRONTATION
The textual, historical, and ethical bases for a societal di-
mension are intellectually and intuitively very appealing. For
those who prefer more "concrete" arguments, however, a socie-
tal dimension of confrontation also appears to have pragmatic
value.
Confrontation between individuals is a special kind of com-
munication event, and the interpersonal effects of confronta-
tion, although still the subject of much research, are not
exactly as "undefined" as the Massachusetts Supreme Court
has suggested.92 Two prominent communications scholars have
concluded that confrontation has significant value for individu-
als.93 Although their research did not involve courtroom con-
frontation,94 Professors Sara E. Newell and Randall K.
Stutman's conclusions regarding social confrontation seem es-
pecially relevant to developing an understanding of the societal
dimension of physical confrontation in the courtroom. Under
their analysis, "confrontation" occurs when one person chal-
lenges another over a social or private rule violation.9 5 In the
courtroom context, the "rule-violating behavior" would be lying
about or misreporting the defendant's conduct.
Thus, it is especially helpful to understand what individu-
als hope to achieve through confrontation. Newell and
Stutman found that:
Generally, individuals share five strategic goals as confronters. First,
method of Confrontation Clause analysis that relies on simple categories as op-
posed to a multidimensional practical reasoning approach to the problem is
likely to produce unjustifiable, unclear, and inconsistent results.
92. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 372.
93. Sara E. Newell & Randall K. Stutman, The Episodic Nature of Social
Confrontation, 14 CoMM. Y.B. 359, 359 (1991).
94. The research focused on confrontation as embodied in social conversa-
tions between acquaintances. Id Although this research was not courtroom-
based, Professor Stutman is an expert in legal communication. He recently
coauthored an excellent book applying current argumentation and persuasion
theory to the legal advocacy process. See RIEKE & STUTMAN, supra note 15.
95. Newell & Stutman, supra note 93, at 359.
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actors confront others as a means of influencing their behavior. The
desired influence most commonly concerns a correction or cessation
of a rule-violating behavior. Second, individuals confront others as a
means of venting frustration. Individuals often allow dissatisfaction
with another to build. Confrontation provides an outlet for this dis-
satisfaction and thus serves as a means for catharsis. Third, individu-
als view confrontation as a vehicle for the maintenance of a strong
relationship. Through the establishment and clarification of rela-
tional or social rules, individuals reaffirm the value of the relation-
ship. Through confrontation, individuals may manage how the other
views the relationship and foster their own views. Fourth, individuals
use confrontation as a means of retribution. By establishing a rule vi-
olation, individuals can seek restitution in forms ranging from apology
to aggressive acts. For some actors, confrontation is the legitimating
action that allows them to seek retribution without being seen as ab-
errant or cruel. Finally, individuals may use confrontation to gain en-
hanced understanding of the other person.
96
This research strongly suggests why individuals feel that con-
frontation is significant to communication, and why they would
believe that confrontation is a critical part of a fair adversarial
proceeding.97 These points, however, focus on the societal di-
mension of confrontation between the defendant and the indi-
vidual witness. It is also important to examine pragmatic
arguments for the existence of the societal dimension of con-
frontation between the individual and the state.
Recent social science research suggests that the legitimacy
and integrity of our adversary process are strengthened by the
societal dimension of confrontation. 98 In one such study, Pro-
fessor Tom R. Tyler sought to identify factors contributing to
respect for and compliance with the law and legal authorities.99
He concluded that individuals are more likely to comply with
96. Id. at 387.
97. This research dealt with unmediated, face-to-face confrontation. One
should not expect the same results from confrontation that was conducted via
videotape or closed-circuit television because these media remove the direct in-
terpersonal interaction that is at the heart of confrontation.
In addition, other communication research suggests that jurors pay more
attention to testimony that is presented to them in mediated forms, such as
videotape, than to live testimony. See GERALD R. MILLER & NORMAN E.
FONTES, VIDEOTAPE ON TRiAL: A VIEW FROM THE JURY Box 100 (1979). This
research supports a pragmatic argument that any "mediated" confrontation-
confrontation via screens, videotape or closed-circuit television-is not only in-
effective in satisfying the three dimensions of the Confrontation Clause, but
by itself unduly prejudices the defendant by "spotlighting" the witness's testi-
mony. This mediated communication alone suggests that the defendant is
guilty of something, if not this particular charge, if the witness must be
shielded by mediated, indirect communication.
98. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
99. Id at 3-7.
[Vol. 76:623
THE THIRD DIMENSION
the law if they believe that legal authorities are legitimate, and
their beliefs about legitimacy are tied to judgments about the
fairness of the procedures used by legal authorities.1°°
His conclusion that participation in decision making is criti-
cal to the perception of procedural justice sheds light on the so-
cietal value of confrontation:
One important element in feeling that procedures are fair is a belief
on the part of those involved that they had an opportunity to take
part in the decision-making process. This includes having an opportu-
nity to present their arguments, being listened to, and having their
views considered by the authorities. Those who feel that they have
had a hand in the decision are typically much more accepting of its
outcome, irrespective of what the outcome is. An additional advan-
tage of procedures that allow both sides to state their arguments is
that each side is exposed to the other. Because a party to a dispute is
often unaware of the feelings and concerns of the other party, this ex-
posure is very important.10 1
Professor Tyler's work not only affirms the personal value of
confrontations between individual disputants, but also suggests
the value of confrontation for an individual and the state.102
100. Id. at 170-73. In defining what is perceived to be a "fair procedure,"
Professor Tyler contrasted the instrumental perspective and the normative
perspective. Id. at 5, 163-69. Under an instrumental perspective, "people de-
fine fairness primarily by the extent to which they are able to influence the
decisions made by the third party." Id. at 163 (citing JOHN W. THIBAUT &
LAUREN S. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JusTicE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYsis 1-2
(1975)). In contrast, under a normative perspective, judgments of fairness may
depend on many different aspects of a procedure "which have little or nothing
to do with outcomes or the control of outcomes." Id. Professor Tyler con-
cluded that his study supported the normative perspective on defining proce-
dural fairness. Id. He found that "seven different aspects of procedure
independently influenced judgments about whether the procedure was fair."
Id. Of these seven aspects, he found that
the criterion of fair procedure most closely related to outcomes (that
is, consistency) [which is the primary value from an instrumental per-
spective] is found to be of minor importance. In contrast, judgments
about the social dimensions of the eperience, such as ethicality,
weigh very heavily in assessments of procedural justice.
Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 163 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia's arguments for the socie-
tal dimension of confrontation support this research with literary analogues.
102. Professor Swift also acknowledged the legitimizing value of requiring
the prosecution to produce the declarant for confrontation with the defendant
if the declarant is available. She wrote:
[r]equiring production of witnesses controls tactical advantage-taking
by government prosecutors and places less risk and burden of im-
peaching and discrediting on criminal defendants. This restraint legit-
imizes the use of government coercion and upholds the integrity of
public officials. The prosecution is held to be above the morals of the
marketplace and must refrain from some of the adversarial behavior
that free choice of declarants would otherwise permit.
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Where the state grants individuals the constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against them, and does all that it
can do to guarantee this confrontation and to protect the pur-
poses behind it when actual confrontation is impossible, an in-
dividual is more likely to view the law and its authorities as
legitimate. In short, zealously guarding the right of confronta-
tion may help, if even in a small way, to legitimize authority
and in turn to encourage people to obey the law.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A THREE-DIMENSIONAL
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
What are the implications of acknowledging a third dimen-
sion to our understanding of the Confrontation Clause and em-
ploying a practical reasoning approach to Confrontation Clause
cases? When a court considers the full, multidimensional
meaning of confrontation, it becomes much more difficult to ad-
mit into evidence a statement made out-of-court and out of the
physical presence of the defendant. This is a hearsay problem,
but in a criminal case it becomes a constitutional problem as
well.103
Swift, supra note 88, at 512 n.45. Professor Tyler's work empirically supports
Professor Swift's argument.
103. Although the focus of this Symposium is hearsay reform, a mul-
tidimensional analysis of the Confrontation Clause also helps to reconcile the
constitutional problems posed by the Confrontation Clause in other contexts,
such as limitations on cross-examination, impeachment, and privilege. See
James B. Haddad, The Future of Confrontation Clause Developments: What
Will Emerge Wien the Supreme Court Synthesizes the Diverse Lines of Con-
frontation Decisions?, 81 J. CRiM. L. & CRnNOLOGY 77 (1990) (arguing that
the Supreme Court's decisions in the hearsay context conflict with the Court's
decisions in the cross-examination and impeachment, privilege, and limiting
instruction cases). For example, when one applies the three dimensions of the
Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court's decision in Olden v. Kentucky, 488
U.S. 227 (1988), makes sense. There, the Court found a violation of the Con-
frontation Clause where the defendant has been deprived of the opportunity
to cross-examine and impeach a witness on a critical issue. Id at 232-33. In
Olden, the procedural dimension of confrontation was not threatened; there
was no concern that the prosecution had manufactured out-of-court state-
ments. However, the evidentiary and societal dimensions were concerns.
First, without being able to cross-examine and potentially impeach the witness
on an essential issue, the reliability of the result would be diminished. Yet the
reliability of the evidence could not have been the Court's only concern. As I
have argued earlier, we have never recognized a constitutional guarantee to a
perfect result. We can and do, however, guarantee that, absent compelling cir-
cumstances, we will give defendants the satisfaction of being able to face the
individuals and the state that will share the responsibility for depriving them
of their liberty. This concern embodies the societal dimension of confronta-
tion. The state has not done all that it can to provide this confrontation if it
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The desire for reliability, the desire to provide a check on
prosecutorial abuses, and the desire to meet the societal de-
mands for confrontation-all of these dimensions combine to
form the "legs" of the Confrontation Clause. When a court rec-
ognizes and applies all three dimensions of the Confrontation
Clause to a particular case, only a truly compelling need can in-
fringe on this constitutional right. Moreover, when a court con-
sciously decides to infringe on the right to confrontation, the
court must do so in the manner that least violates the dimen-
sions of the confrontation right.
What does this mean in practical terms? First, the inequal-
ity between the defense and prosecution burdens for proving
the reliability of a hearsay statement that Professor im-
winkelried noted turns out to be entirely justifiable. The prose-
cution's burden is warranted, even if it is heavier than the
defendant's burden, for three reasons. Each reason corresponds
to one of the three dimensions of confrontation. On the eviden-
tiary dimension, both the prosecution and defendant are re-
quired to prove a basic level of reliability when introducing
hearsay; thus, the prosecutor's initial burden is no greater than
the defendant's. 3- 4 Because of the procedural dimension of con-
frontation, however, the prosecution's burden is heavier in that
the state must prove reliability by demonstrating the circum-
stances of the statement's making as a check on the evidence's
integrity. Finally, the societal dimension of confrontation also
places a heavier burden on the prosecution in order to assure
the defendant that when the statement must be admitted be-
cause of sheer necessity, such as the unavailability of the de-
clarant, the system will do its best to require the strongest
showing of reliability possible.
The practical reasoning approach to the three-dimensional
produces the accusing witness but prohibits the defendant from impeaching
the witness on the most critical points of his or her testimony.
Compare Olden with United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). In
Owens the state produced an accusing witness who had no recollection of the
underlying events. Id, at 555-56. The procedural dimension was satisfied be-
cause the prosecution proved that it had not fabricated or orchestrated the wit-
ness's statements. The evidentiary dimension was not much of a
consideration; confrontation of this witness was futile in producing a more re-
liable result. However, the state had done everything in its power to satisfy
the societal dimension-that is, to provide the defendant with the right to con-
frontation, the only satisfaction it could guarantee.
104. This is true simply as a matter of evidentiary rule analysis. Unreliable
evidence could have no probative value on any matter to be proved. Thus, it




Confrontation Clause supports the conclusion that, except in
extraordinary cases, the prosecution must produce the declar-
ant or provide a specific showing that the declarant is unavaila-
ble. What would constitute an extraordinary case? United
States v. Inadi105 was unique in that it dealt with statements
that were made during the crime, not during an investigation
after the crime. Indeed, one could argue that the statements
were part of the crime because the statements of co-conspira-
tors can function as criminal acts themselves- ° 6 Because the
statements had independent legal significance, that is, signifi-
cance apart from their truth or falsity, the reliability dimension
was not relevant. Moreover, the Inadi Court could be confi-
dent that it was not violating the second dimension of the Con-
frontation Clause because no government agent or inquisitorial
process helped to create the statement.
One might argue that the Inadi Court recognized the socie-
tal dimension, but decided to dispense with it because of practi-
cal considerations, such as the burden that an unavailability
requirement placed on the prosecution in conspiracy cases and
because the defendant could call an available declarant under
the Compulsory Process Clause. 0 7 It is not clear from the In-
adi opinion that the Court truly considered the societal dimen-
sion to the Confrontation Clause as I have outlined it here.
Moreover, even if the Court was aware of the societal dimen-
sion, the justifications for dispensing with it in the co-conspira-
tor context are not compelling. 0 8 Thus, the Inadi decision is
inconsistent with a three-dimensional interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause.
105. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
106. See FED. R. EviD. 801(c). In this sense, the statements are not hearsay
(out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted), but in-
stead are statements that have independent legal significance. GRAHAM C.
LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 6.2, at 183-86 (2d ed.
1987).
107. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992).
108. As Professor Berger and others have so persuasively demonstrated,
the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment were meant together to serve as a
restraint on government. See Berger, supra note 2; Kirst, supra note 14. Thus,
burden on the prosecution cannot serve as an excuse for infringing on the
Sixth Amendment rights of the accused. Moreover, it is absurd to argue that
because the defendant has a constitutional right to compulsory process, the
Court may dispense with the accused's independent right of confrontation.
The defendant has no obligation to put on a defense by calling witnesses. It is
the prosecution's obligation to prove its case without violating the defendant's
constitutional rights. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 612-22 (1988).
[Vol. 76:623
THE THIRD DIMENSION.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in White v. Illinois is
even less justifiable than its decision in Inrdi. Although the
majority in White purported to focus on the reliability or evi-
dentiary dimension of confrontation, it failed to satisfy even
this dimension. The Court looked to the fact that the state-
ments were admitted under the "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions" of "spontaneous declarations" and "statements made in
the course of securing medical treatment" as evidence that they
were sufficiently reliable to meet the Confrontation Clause.1 09
However, the "reliability" rationale of the exception for sponta-
neous declarations has been more the result of tradition than of
fact, and has been soundly criticized by commentators-a fact
ignored by the Supreme Court." 0 Moreover, even assuming
that the exception for statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment, which Chief Justice Rehnquist mis-
stated as the exception for a "statement made in the course of
procuring medical services,""' is firmly rooted, the White
Court misapplied the exception to statements revealing the
identity of the defendant. While misstating the cause of an in-
jury might result in misdiagnosis or mistreatment, statements
109. White, 112 S. Ct. at 742. This is actually a misstatement of the excep-
tion, correctly identified in the Court's footnote as the exception for state-
ments made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 740 n.2.
110. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439
(1928) ("What the emotion gains by way of overcoming the desire to lie, it
loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation."). More recent com-
mentators have continued to emphasize the questionable reliability of "excited
utterances" or "spontaneous exclamations." See, e.g., Mason Ladd, The Hear-
say We Admit, 5 OQLA. L. REV. 271, 286 (1952) ("If judged from the standpoint
of the reliability of the representations on the basis of perception, the law re-
lating to the admission of spontaneous exclamations is amazing. If the ob-
server speaks before he thinks, the evidence is admissible; if he thinks before
he speaks, it is excluded."); Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal
Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1114-15 (1969) (sug-
gesting that because of the unreliability of excited utterances, their admissibil-
ity should be limited to cases of necessity in which the declarant is
unavailable). Compare Charles W. Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and
the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 210
(1960) ("[If unavailability is required [under the rules of evidence] before the
admission of such reliable hearsay as former testimony at least a showing of
inconvenience should be required before admitting the much less reliable
spontaneous exclamation. The logic of this proposal seems unassailable.")
with White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992) ("Roberts stands for the propo-
sition that unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made
in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.").
111. White, 112 S. Ct. at 743.
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regarding the specific identity of the assailant are irrelevant to
diagnosis and treatment. Statements of identity thus carry no
"special guarantees of credibility," 1 2 and traditionally have
been excluded under this exception.113 Although the White
majority suggested that the reliability of the statement is the
key to satisfying the Confrontation Clause, it showed little ac-
tual concern for the reliability dimension of confrontation.
Moreover, when a child makes a statement about sexual
abuse that has already occurred, the statement immediately be-
comes part of the adversarial, inquisitorial process, and it may
become nearly impossible to reconstruct which statements are
the product of the child's own recollection and which come
from someone else involved in the government investigation by,
perhaps quite innocent or mistaken, suggestions. 114 In such a
case, the admission of hearsay violates the procedural dimen-
sion of the Confrontation Clause.
Perhaps our judicial system could minimize the danger of
violating the procedural dimension of confrontation if, as Pro-
fessor Berger suggests, the state videotapes children's state-
ments so that the trier of fact can scrutinize the investigator's
conduct. 1 15 Videotaping or using closed-circuit television is not
a solution to the confrontation problem, however, if the child is
available, in the evidentiary sense, to testify.116 For, even if the
112. Id at 743.
113. See United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979). When
statements concern the identity of the perpetrator of the injury or the fault of
the party causing the injury, the relevance to diagnosis and treatment van-
ishes, and the guarantees of reliability vanish with it. See FED. R. EviD. 803(4)
advisory committee's note; 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(4)[01] (1988). In United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d
430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985), the court held that statements made by a child to a
physician regarding the identity of the person who abused her were admissible
when there was no evidence to indicate that the child made the statement for
a reason other than treatment. The court noted, however, that the child was
available and did actually testify at trial. Id at 440.
114. See SUGGESTIBILITY, supra note 48 (collecting articles).
115. Berger, supra note 2, at 612.
116. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the related issue of
whether a particular child may be proved to be unavailable because he or she
would suffer severe and permanent psychological damage from testifying.
There are several excellent decisions on this point, most notably Common-
wealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988). However, the Bergstron
court suggests that the prosecutor would have to establish unavailability be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 369. It seems unnecessary, for the purposes of
protecting a defendant's constitutional rights, to "convict" a witness of being a
potential mentally ill patient. A lower, but realistic standard, such as "clear
and convincing" evidence of unavailability, might be more equitable and ethi-
cal for both sides.
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state had videotaped the child's statements in White, they
could not have been played before the trier of fact if they were
taped outside the presence of the defendant. To do so would vi-
olate the third dimension of confrontation; the state would
have deprived the defendant of the societal right to confront
the person accusing him of a heinous act, a person who might
have been mistaken but persuasive to the trier of fact.
Nevertheless, there are occasions when, out of compelling
need, a court may consider and yet dispense with the societal
dimension. One instance is when the societal dimension must
give way to absolute necessity, such as when the declarant is
unavailable." 7 Another instance might be where no real socie-
tal value is provided by confrontation. This may very well be
the case in a confrontation between a child and an adult. Be-
cause of the difference in vulnerability and power between the
individuals, a confrontation between child and adult may be
qualitatively and ethically different than a confrontation be-
tween two adults.
Yet this is not the kind of determination that one can or
should make as a general black letter rule, as the White court
would suggest. The accused, who loses the societal dimension
of confrontation, is at least entitled to a court's evaluation of
whether the sacrifice of the societal dimension is necessary in
this particular case. This is the approach suggested by the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Berg-
strom, which requires a case-specific finding of unavailability in
order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause of its state constitu-
tion.118 This is also the approach the petitioner requested and
the Court rejected in White."19
The damage of the White decision is that it dispenses with
the societal dimension of confrontation in all cases of state-
ments by a child admitted under the spontaneous declarations
and medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exceptions, regard-
less of the particular circumstances. Many children might be
justifiably excused from testifying, and many hearsay state-
ments admitted, under the Bergstrom rule that the danger of
"severe and permanent psychological damage" is a ground of
117. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
118. 524 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Mass. 1988).
119. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992). The petitioner had argued
for "a general rule that hearsay testimony offered by a child should be permit-
ted only upon a showing of necessity-i.e., in cases where necessary to protect
the child's physical and psychological well-being." Z&
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unavailability.12° However, it is not clear that such unavailabil-
ity would be found in every case of child testimony. Moreover,
White's language is quite broad, applying to cases beyond the
painful and emotionally charged context of a child sexual abuse
case. Where the confrontation is not between a child and an
adult, the need to dispense with the societal dimension of con-
frontation becomes much less compelling.
Consideration of all three dimensions of confrontation,
under a process of practical reasoning, leads to the conclusion
that direct and unmediated physical face-to-face confrontation
between criminal defendants and the witnesses against them,
including hearsay declarants, is constitutionally required in the
absence of compelling reasons for infringing on that right and
the provision of all possible safeguards. The United States
Supreme Court is acting in an inconsistent fashion in its Con-
frontation Clause cases. 12 ' The damage to the Sixth Amend-
ment can be contained by limiting Inadi and White as much as
possible to their special factual contexts, but state courts, inter-
preting their own state constitutions, should not follow the
Supreme Court's one-dimensional interpretation of the Con-
frontation Clause. 2 2 Courts, both federal and state, should face
the full meaning of the constitutional right to confrontation.
120. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 369.
121. See Haddad, supra note 103, at 78-80.
122. Perhaps the Supreme Court will eventually acknowledge the other
dimensions of confrontation. Justices Thomas and Scalia appear to be aware
of the procedural dimension in White. See 112 S. Ct. at 744 (Thomas and
Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and in the judgment). Moreover, Justice Scalia
seems to be acutely aware of the societal dimension of confrontation. See Coy
v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). All the Court needs to do is put these dimen-
sions together with the reliability dimension to produce more consistent and
justifiable decisions in its Confrontation Clause cases. C. Kirst, supra note 14,
at 489 ("It is clearly wrong to assume that all possible dimensions of confronta-
tion doctrine have been expressly mentioned in the Court's opinions. Com-
mon law development is possible only if the Court is free to employ
dimensions it has not previously cataloged.").
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